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This paper advocates a revised perspective in historical analysis. The 
author calls for historians to apply the concept of reputation as 
interpretive lens in the analysis of historical processes and outcomes. 
Widely used in management and marketing writing, but also relied upon 
in political science, the concept of reputation helps predict behaviour of 
individuals and entities that are bound by political constraints to align 
their actions to the goal of generating a popular standing. The lens also 
serves to cast light on the actions engaged in by external stakeholders 
that are informed by reputational cues. This theoretical contention is 
illustrated in four case studies resulting from investigations into political 
decisions and military conflicts both in the republican and imperial period 
that ascertain how success and expansion as well as failure and decline 
of ancient Rome can be viewed and better understood by applying 
reputation as an instrument to direct and focus historical analysis. 
However, the purpose of this paper is not primarily to suggest 
complementary angles and alternative answers to issues in ancient 
Roman history. The cases considered are intended to demonstrate how 
failure to recognise reputation as a significant concept in historical 
analysis does not only impair a comprehensive and balanced reflection 
of personal and organisational stakeholder behaviour, but also thwarts a 
full appreciation of the motivation that drives individual protagonists and 





The need felt by individuals and organisations to build, protect and 
restore reputation as acknowledged in the practice of Public Relations is 
a driving force that appears to be critical in political and corporate 
contexts and shapes personal as well as institutional behaviour and 
relationships. This premise calls for a new or revised perspective in 
historical analysis – even in cases where communication management, 
PR or proto-PR are not ostensibly the theme or case under 
consideration. Reasons for and causes of decisions that lead to a shift in 
national politics and corporate strategy may be rooted in an appreciation 
of the need to seek and manage personal or organisational prestige or 
standing. Likewise, stakeholders’ responses to organisational or 
individual behaviour are reflective of guidance informed by reputational 
patterns. As a result, historians are called upon to adopt a new 
interpretative lens to supplement the distinct perspectives currently 
deployed to make sense of the past, account for what happened and 
fathom what failed to occur. 
 
This understanding of strategic priorities may add to and broaden the 
scaffolding that would conventionally shape historical interpretation. The 
resulting shift of angle and emphasis moulds the direction of enquiry and 
focus deployed by the historian. At the same time this requires 
inferences arrived at in the past to be reappraised. This paper feeds 
both on existing case studies and new material the author has 
scrutinized only recently and is intended as a preliminary exploration of 
what over time may lead to a more comprehensive re-evaluation of 
historical narrative and may eventually bring about the recognition of 
reputation as an indispensable concept and instrument of historical 
investigation. 
 
Using conceptual frameworks in comparative historical analysis 
 
The methodology adopted for this paper is a comparative historical 
enquiry in the shape of a qualitative case oriented investigation which 
allows to generate explanations that transcend space and time by 
reflecting on causalities and ascertaining how processes of change are 
driven. The core of these investigations is constituted by phenomena 
and factors that are conceptualised through engagement with theoretical 
frameworks (Ragin, 2014) – in this instance the analytical focus is on 
reputation. This method of enquiry has been buoyant for the better part 
of the past two centuries, when at times social sciences were dominated 
by the tradition of comparative historical case studies that counted 
among its advocates illustrious figures ranging from Adam Smith, Karl 
Marx and Alexis de Tocqueville to Max Weber and Marc Bloch 
(Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003). 
 
It is the purpose of this comparative historical analysis to juxtaposition 
scenarios and search for conceptual patterns as well as causalities 
across the cases selected. While highly diverse incidents and settings 
were chosen, care was taken to ensure that similarities in processes 
could be identified (Pierson and Skogpol, 2002). This paper was 
informed by the intention to explain causal configurations that bring 
about tangible historical outcomes. By implication concerns with 
interpretive approaches were eschewed in favour of attempts to arrive at 
causal patterns. The adopted focus on a limited number of cases does 
not lead to nor aim for universally generalisable inferences, but 
recognises the study-set up as a trade-off to facilitate a mutual exchange 
between theory and evidence by allowing the historian to move back and 
forth between the two with a view to unearth and corroborate new 
explanations and match patterns (Campbell, 1975). 
 
Comparative historical analysis has for decades found itself in the thick 
of methodological disputes that witnessed supporters of large-N 
methods pitched against those who sympathise with small-N methods. 
The view taken in this paper whereby inferences can be made from a 
small number of cases is strongly contested by social scientists wary of 
bias in the selection of sources and data (Goldthorpe, 1991; Lustick, 
1996). These concerns can be allayed by demonstrating that 
investigations based on limited case numbers can live up to the 
standards set in statistical studies (Ragin, 2000; Braumoeller and 
Goertz, 2000). For this to be assured deep understanding of the cases 
investigated and critical engagement with archival work is intended to 
ward off criticism about the scientific robustness of case study analysis, 
minimise misunderstandings, allow to focus the investigation on the 
motivations of the historical protagonists and help overcome 
historiographical biases and gaps in the sources used (Ferro, 2003; 
Amneta, 2009).  
 
A dialogue is sought with the available sources in order to ascertain if 
and to what degree the researcher’s intentions and initial hypothesis are 
corroborated by the data available (Donnelly and Norton, 2011). The 
value and quality attainable through careful scrutiny of primary sources 
and critical reading of secondary material is by now widely recognised 
not just among historians, but also by social scientists who choose to 
ground and test their models in data gleaned from historical cases 
(Amneta, 2009).  
 
For Rorty (2002) historians need to concentrate and limit themselves to 
their genuine tools and resources, which he defines as historical sources 
and the ability to read critically. However, the pure empiricist’s self-
imposed constraint and exclusive focus on the mere analysis of sources, 
for all its advantages, always has had its detractors. Going as far back 
as the 17th century, Francis Bacon was allegedly underwhelmed by an 
undiluted empiricism who he likened to the obsession of ants with 
gathering material for the mere sake of piling up mountains of resources. 
Bacon found himself inspired by a bee that turns the collected raw 
material into something better – namely honey. Historians may 
recognise in Bacon’s parable a suggestion as to how they should 
approach their work (Holland, 1983) and take it as a plea to draw on 
theoretical frameworks as stimuli that focus attention and raise questions 
the empiricist should pursue and be guided by. 
 
The use of concepts is frowned upon by some in part for what 
disparagingly is referred to as jargon and in part for the concomitant 
generalisations – intrinsic to theorising - that are taunted as speculative 
history (Barzun, 1974). Yet regardless of any apprehension, theoretical 
concepts are central to historical analysis as historians through their very 
language impose classifications on their sources and phenomena 
observed as testified through the widely used terms such as class, 
hegemony or social mobility, which are adopted in historical analysis as 
they help define more precisely phenomena, facilitate accurate 
differentiation and direct insights (Erikson, 1989). 
 
Historians are expected to select, analyse and compare data they find 
and eventually arrive at more universal inferences. Indeed, as Evans-
Pritchard reminds us, “events lose much, even all of their meaning if 
they are not seen as having some degree of regularity and constancy, 
as belonging to a certain type of event, all instances of which have many 
features in common” (Evans-Pritchard, 1962). Emerging theoretical 
concepts are thus grounded in the observation of commonalities 
between actions and individuals with a view to detect cumulative effects 
that result in an institutionalisation of behaviour and a taxonomy of 
phenomena (Tosh, 2010) which historians in turn avail themselves of 
when they refer to generalising concepts such as Absolute Monarchy, 
Feudalism or the Renaissance. Each of which serves as an ideal model 
that is instrumental in breaking down complex phenomena, identifying 
what is typical in a scenario and supplying the historian with a well-
defined technical term that aids understanding (Erikson, 1989; Whitelam, 
1995). 
 
Clearly, as with all theoretical concepts drawn from the social sciences 
one needs to handle them with care, be discriminating about what tenets 
to espouse and avoid over-theorising at the expense of evidence 
(Kraditor, 1972; Tosh, 2010). As neither is a neutral tool, all concepts 
come charged with assumptions. That is in part what explains their 
purpose: Indispensable in the historian’s endeavour to raise new 
questions, they provide the lens that directs to new investigative paths, 
offer a coherent perspective and potentially allow the research to 
consider alternative explorative avenues and arrive at new answers. 
This, it could be argued, is a value in its own right, even though it should 
not be claimed that any one investigative lens exhaustively produces the 
right answer or, for that matter, the only answer (Donnelly and Norton, 
2011) - but an answer that is complementary which is a merit in itself 
and beneficial to the explorative discourse rigorous historical analysis is 
predicated on. 
 
Theoretical concepts do not just serve to predict future behavioural 
patterns, but they have also become irremissible instruments that lend 
themselves to understand, put into perspective and explain past 
behaviour and processes by proposing an angle that frames and 
accounts for action and outcomes. Against this backdrop it is argued in 
this paper that the concept of reputation should serve as an interpretive 
instrument that leads historians to judgements and conclusions which 
reflect a collective overriding concern of historical entities and individuals 
for and awareness of public appearance and image.  
 
The adoption of reputation as a theoretical concept that serves to 
elucidate past events and predict upcoming developments appears to 
constitute a stimulus to the investigative method of historical analysis 
and readjust the focus of empirical enquiry. While sociologists would in 
this context talk of prestige, in management studies the term reputation 
is widely used and familiar and it appears convenient to go with what is 
known and amply defined. 
 
Reputation as a multidisciplinary concept 
 
A discussion of seminal literature and a review of the diverse purposes 
reputation is known to serve will subsequently assist the researcher in 
deploying the theoretical concept as a prism that refracts scenarios and 
helps guide analysis of historical processes and outcomes. Its 
established origins in management and business literature prevent us 
from applying the notion of reputation in a broader societal and political 
context without careful consideration and prior clarification of its 
definition which is somewhat ambiguous as a result of a variety of 
academic disciplines that have been instrumental in shaping the concept 
(Frombrun and Shanley, 1990; Fombrun, 1996; Rindova and Fombrun, 
1999) Barnett et al., 2006).  
 
Bromley (2001) defines reputation in terms of an explicit statement 
delineating collective images. This view matches Shenkar’s (1997) 
earlier more instrumental angle that regards reputation an uncertainty 
resolving mechanism. A perspective subscribed to by Dowling (2008) 
who in his study on Australian corporations flags up reputation’s function 
to lend orientation to internal and external publics – an assertion which 
commands particular pertinence in businesses associated with the 
service industry (Fombrun and Rindova, 1996; Roper and Fill, 2012), 
whose performance with regard to their respective quality is particularly 
complex to assess. Transcending the service sector, reputation can be 
drawn on as a tool deployed by third parties to arrive at judgements of 
phenomena, organisations or individuals, whose quality and 
performance they have no personal and first-hand experiences with. 
Reputation’s role extends into proffering cues for a range of publics and 
allaying particular stakeholders’ concerns (Omar 2005) which results in 
the build-up of trust in current quality and performance as well as 
confidence in future satisfactory delivery of results (Eisenegger, 2009).  
 
Furthermore, reputation is an asset that guarantees substantial benefits: 
It educates audiences on an organisation’s most appealing traits and 
expands senior management’s strategic choices (Fombrun, 1996). More 
recently, in a similar vein, Jensen and Roy (2008) demonstrate how 
external constituents draw on reputational information as a proxy to 
predict likely performance and anticipate behavioural patterns. 
Therefore, it seems justified to ascribe to reputation the potential of 
enhancing an organisation’s competitive advantage in so far as it guides 
the behaviour of stakeholders who lack comprehensive information 
about an entity or individual and therefore rely for guidance on 
aggregated perceptions or reputation (Caves and Porter, 1977; Weigelt 
and Camerer, 1988). 
 
There is wide consensus that an entity’s reputation is the result of an 
aggregate inference, resulting from a range of transactions and 
touchpoints sustained over a period of time between publics on the one 
hand and organisations on the other.  (Harrison, 1995; Fombrun, 1996; 
Black and Carnes, 2000; Argenti and Druckenmiller, 2004; Fill, 2009; 
Maarek, 2011). Going by this definition reputation can be regarded to be 
more stable and comprehensive a concept and evidently less flexible by 
comparison to erratic images which it is instrumental in amalgamating 
(Fombrun, 1996). Murray and White (2004) add to this definition the 
insight that a recognition among stakeholders for consistency in 
demeanour, action and communications over time moulds a corporate or 
individual reputation and charges it with cues to render it distinctive and 
make it stand out from competition (Fombrun, 1996; Schweizer and 
Nachoem, 1999). To this pivotal role a risk is attached: There is 
consensus among writers in the field and abundant empirical evidence 
to conclude that reputation can erode abruptly, while constructing it 
requires time (Lang and Lang, 1988; Lang and Lang, 1990). Since 
reputation reveals itself as a cross-disciplinary idea that is committed to 
the core corporate objectives and operational processes of an 
organisation or individual and bound to reflect its mission, values and 
vision - in brief, its distinctiveness – it amounts to an instrument that 
minimises and fends off competition (Fombrun, 1998; Schwaiger, 2004). 
 
Eisenegger et al. (2010) expanded the concept and grounded their 
conclusions in the assumption that reputation is a means to justify 
worldly power domestically. While it is understood that reputation does 
have a role to play as a vindication of unequal power distribution within a 
political entity, academic literature is still predominantly conceptualising 
its function in a modern business and consumerist context (Eisenegger 
et al., 2010). 
 
In viewing reputation through the lens of political science Weisiger and 
Yarhi-Milo (2015) point out that national leaders consider a reputation for 
managerial and political decisiveness as a particularly desirable trait. 
They cite the example of the former US President Harry Truman who at 
the outset of the Korean conflict insisted on shaping his public 
perception by standing firm to the Communist adversary. He reasoned 
that a visible unswerving stand in the face of a military challenge could 
mould his administration’s reputation and translate into public support 
while in contrast images of weakness may be construed as an invitation 
to international aggressors elsewhere.  
 
The case of Truman is reflective of the concept of reputation developed 
in international relations literature, research into the Cold War and 
issues related to deterrence. The argument advanced by Schelling 
(1981) suggests that countries with a record of following up threats with 
action, build a reputation as serious contenders at the international 
stage. The opposite may result from a scenario whereby a country 
becomes known for backing down in situations of conflict. The 
underlying assumption in this model is an acknowledgement that past 
action serves as proxy for future performance.  
 
This theoretical assumption has been illustrated in records about the 
confrontational summit in 1961 which the Soviet leader Khrushchev 
used as a platform to issue his plan aimed at altering the status of Berlin 
(Dallek 2003; Khrushchev, 2000; Taubman 2003). It is interesting to note 
that the Soviet leader had raised the same proposals in 1958 but did not 
care to follow them up in the final years of the Eisenhower administration 
while waiting for a new President to take over with relatively limited 
experience and expertise in international politics. Kennedy – aware of 
the Kremlin’s intentions - was keen to clarify publicly that under no 
circumstances would he concede defeat and allow the Soviet Union to 
take forward its plans of declaring West Berlin a neutral city (Dallek 
2003).  
 
The positions of both leaders has in recent years been interpreted in the 
context of reputation management by suggesting that Kennedy through 
bold and determined action hoped to hammer home the message that 
the new man in the White House would not allow himself to be pushed 
over by any international leader. This stance carried a strategic value as 
it intended to dissuade Krushchev from challenging the international 
status-quo. In other words, Kennedy’s response to this incident early on 
in his Presidency helped to establish his reputation and – if well 
managed – reduce the likelihood of similar external challenges being 
mounted in subsequent years (Khrushchev, 2000; Dallek, 2003). 
 
Kennedy’s stance appears to have been guided by the expectation that 
Khrushchev’s tactics were not informed by an intimate understanding of 
his opposite, but rather a tentative reputational rationale: Kennedy was 
young in years and limited in experience, both features that defined his 
public persona at the time and were used as proxy for any judgment of 
his political acumen and strength of personality (Taubman 2003). It 
appears that external and internal stakeholders seek to put the resolve 
of a new incumbent to a test which is the defining moment for an 
emerging reputation. Aware of this challenge, new leaders engage in 
actual or virtual activities that nudge this process to bring about a 
desired reputational narrative that demonstrates resolve.  
 
Applying reputation as an interpretive prism in historical analysis 
 
On the following pages it shall now be attempted to expand the 
disciplinary remit of reputation by proposing the concept as an 
interpretive instrument of history writing and historical analysis. To this 
end, prominent turning points in history will be zoomed in on in case 
studies that assist in exploring how activities engaged in by political 
leaders may have been pursued as a result of concerns about 
organisational image and public persona. The paper also scrutinizes 
how external stakeholders’ behavioural patterns are informed by their 
judgement of reputational information about an individual or political 
entity. Based on historical precedence the author proffers a hypothesis 
by suggesting that political reforms or the lack of them, declaration of 
wars and the strenuous efforts to forge a peace accord, pacifist 
demeanour as well as aggressive grandstanding may not be so much 
linked to an individual leader’s personality, political circumstance or 
structural constraints, but may rather be understood through the lens of 
a theoretical concept that envisages strategic manoeuvres in the context 
of winning and losing reputation which is instrumental in shoring up the 
position of an individual or political body at the helm of a hierarchy.  
 
By drawing on four cases it will be elucidated how applying reputation as 
an interpretive prism informs historical analysis in distinct ways.  
 
1. The Second Punic War reveals the role reputation plays in shaping 
strategic decisions by informing the prediction of long-term security 
and political benefit. 
2. An overview of Emperor Augustus’ reign helps discern why 
particular communication strategy and tactics are pursued and 
how political choices can be understood against a background of 
imperial reputation building.  
3. Claudius’ move to occupy Britannia casts a light on reputation as a 
contributory factor for transformational political decisions and the 
underlying motivations leading to them. 
4. A discussion of the fall of the Roman Empire zooms in on how 
reputation assists in understanding the reconfiguration of political 
and military power balances as a result of reversed collective 
behavioural patterns among adversaries. 
 
The cases are selected in reflection of the author’s area of historical 
expertise. The scenarios outlined represent prominent turning points or 
high-profile conflicts in history which should allow both the non-expert 
reader and scholars with a specialisation in management and 
communication to grasp the chronology, context and merit of the 
arguments advanced. 
 
Reputation’s role in making long term predictions: Who is credible 
and trusted to deliver? 
 
The Second Punic War between Rome and Carthage was characterised 
in the first phase by major battles across the Italian peninsula that 
culminated on August 2nd 216 BC in the Carthaginians’ spectacular 
victory in Cannae. What followed during the second phase of the conflict 
was a war of attrition until 211 BC when the tide turned against the 
Carthaginian under the command of Hannibal. 
 
It will be scrutinized in the following paragraphs how in this context the 
concept of reputation could be critical in enhancing the understanding of 
the conflict and its outcome with particular attention being cast at the 
numbers and supply of soldiers that throughout the war remained a core 
concern for Hannibal. Polybius (1923) believes the numbers of Roman 
and allied soldiers in 225 amounted to 700.000 infantry and 70.000 
cavalry (Baronowski, 1993). Brunt even contends that Rome for its levy 
could draw on an Italian population of 875.000 adult males (Brunt, 
1971). By contrast, Hannibal’s army had shrunk in size on its march from 
Spain until the crossing of the Alps and by the time he arrived in the Po 
valley he was left with 20.000 infantry and 6000 cavalry under this 
command, complemented by 14.000 Gallic soldiers (Lazenby, 1998). 
  
Polybius (1923) argues that Hannibal realised with frustration that his 
armies’ victories in the field had not brought about defections in large 
numbers among the Italian cities tied to Rome in a network of alliances. 
There may be two ways of explaining why this anticipated meltdown 
never materialised: In part, local states were still in awe of Rome’s 
military record and in part Hannibal’s heavy handed approach did not 
suggest an alliance with him would be a better alternative. Upon the 
realisation that initial military prowess did not make the anticipated 
inroads, Hannibal resorted to propaganda and posed after the battles of 
Trebbia and Lake Trasimene as Hellenic liberator who promised 
privileges and freedom to the cities of Capua, Locri and the Lucanian 
tribes (Livy, 1929). 
 
Fronda (2010) argues that this reformed approach indeed helped along 
Hannibal’s cause in as far as it won him new allies and ultimately 
recruits for this depleted army. What, however, appears even more 
important to consider is the message that reverberated across Italy as a 
result from the Carthaginian’s victories over some of the smaller Roman 
allies. This stirred questions as to whether Rome could still deliver on 
the promised protection from an adversary which nudged municipal 
leaders to reconsider the benefits that came with defection (Goldsworthy 
2000). According to Livy, raising these doubts may well have been part 
of a plan pursued by Hannibal (Polybius, 1923; Livy, 1929). 
 In the months ensuing the victory at Cannae the Carthaginians availed 
themselves of the unique opportunity to make up for their persistent lack 
in manpower and indeed they appeared to be making some headway in 
persuading nearly all Greek towns along the coast of modern day 
Calabria to side with Hannibal. However, this success was clouded as 
the Carthaginians had to divert forces to bludgeon some cities such as 
Petelia and Consentia into swapping sides. Even more daunting for 
Hannibal was the relative loyalty among most cities elsewhere in Italy as 
a result of the close relationship the local aristocracy entertained with 
Rome  (Fronda, 2010). 
 
The bulk of cities in the Roman alliance must have followed attentively 
news of recent confrontations as well as the developments of the conflict 
and blended this information into an emerging judgement of likely 
outcomes. Posturing and grandstanding of both rivals may have fed into 
that equation as did images moulded by past experiences and 
encounters with either war party. This reputational information was 
further moulded in Rome’s favour in the immediate aftermath of the 
Roman backed revolt in the city of Capua which demonstrated that 
Hannibal was short of the military means or the political acumen to hold 
on to large cities when faced with opposition. Rome followed up this 
tangible success by placing garrisons in various municipalities. While 
their military role is disputed, it seems clear that the show of force and 
physical presence had a symbolic value as it suggested the leading 
Italian city meant to stay loyal to its partners. While loyalty was perhaps 
not a category local elites may have espoused, their perusal of 
diplomatic options and military alternatives may well have been guided 
by the desire to end up on the winning side of the conflict. Member cities 
within the alliance therefore grounded these crucial decisions in 
reputational information that mirrors symbolic and actual behaviour. 
 
Hannibal’s mistakes in the struggle for reputational superiority, it may be 
argued, started earlier than the discomfiture at Capua. He appears not to 
have considered the reputational gain a pursuit of the survivors after his 
victory in Cannae would have earned him when he stood a chance to 
eliminate the remaining 10.000 Roman legionaries and capture the 
surviving consul Terentius Varro (O’Connell, 2011; Miles, 2012). While 
the loss in manpower – as was demonstrated earlier on – may not have 
forced Rome onto its knees, the message of a complete Roman 
annihilation could not have been lost on his allies, particularly as the exit 
of Varro from the scene would imminently have signalled that Carthage’s 
adversary is without a leader. 
 
In a nutshell, Hannibal was outnumbered throughout the war and 
growing the ranks was a vital task. No amount of strategic manoeuvring 
and military ingenuity would have made up for the inequality in 
manpower. It may be inferred from the evidence reviewed that 
Hannibal’s strategy in the long run could therefore not have been 
exclusively military, but had to be communicative in kind, predicated on 
drawing on reputational credit as an instrument to encourage large scale 
defections among Rome’s allies. Indeed, Fronda (2010) sees the causes 
of the ultimate Carthaginian defeat in Hannibal’s inability to win over 
more Italian communities which contributed significantly to his overall 
strategic failure in the Italian theatre of the war and thus accounts for 
Rome’s victory over Carthage in the Second Punic War.  
 
Reputation in the Augustean era: Discerning the rationale for 
imperial communication and politics 
 
It will be argued that the behaviour of Augustus seems to be consistent 
and aligned with a goal: The establishment of an unassailable position of 
personal political command and the engineering of the public recognition 
that he is the benefactor of the republic – not its enemy, which Caesar 
had been discredited as by his detractors. Applying a reputational lens in 
historical analysis may therefore allow the observer to discern how this 
goal fed both into imperial communication and politics in the Augustean 
era. 
 
Once he had put an end to civil war, Augustus turned his attention to a 
restoration of traditions, religion and values and the identity of the 
republic itself. By directing and coordinating his policies and 
communications he carefully associated himself with symbols and 
terminology that widely represented the old republic which he claimed to 
restore, thereby meeting a deeply felt popular sentiment (Petersen, 
2005). 
 
Augustus’ ability and willingness to meet widely voiced political 
expectations visibly affected the public sentiment towards him. His key 
strategy in his autobiographical notes Res Gestae was to portray himself 
as modest, pious and abiding by republican traditions (Augustus, 2009). 
Historians found evidence to confirm that images of heavy-handedness 
towards the established elites were consistently avoided (Holland, 2005; 
Galinsky, 2012) and that Augustus “went to a great deal of trouble to 
conceal the thoroughly un-republican reality of his absolute authority“ 
(Everitt, 2006, 247). The statues that throughout Augustus’ reign were 
erected in cities across the empire were not willed by the Emperor; 
instead it has been argued that they were the tangible expression of 
popular sentiment (Galinsky, 1996). Their erection reflects a dialogue 
between the ruler and subjects who wanted to venerate their leader. In 
turn Augustus gradually conceded to have himself portrayed as an 
object of veneration (Alföldi, 1977). Arguably, the statues were intended 
as focus points for imperial reverence, rather than means for the 
divulgation of complex messages.  
 
There seems to be agreement that architectural projects in the capital 
Rome were directed by the Emperor himself. Yet Augustus’ vision for the 
city did not envisage his images at the centre of lavish palaces, squares 
and temple districts (Weber et al 2003). Instead his message was 
consensus and a united society. He was a man who did not force public 
opinion, but favoured architecture as a symbolic tool to bring about a 
sense of gratitude and popular approval (Levick, 2010). While he hoped 
to achieve applause and recognition, he refrained from commanding it. 
Hölscher (2000) termed this approach a ritual of orchestrated plurality 
under the supervision of Augustus. The Ara Pacis, a splendid altar 
dedicated to harmony and prosperity embodied Augustus’ image as the 
guarantor of peace. On the Augustus Forum he had statues of his 
ancestors lined up, thus tracing back his family to Rome’s Trojan 
founding fathers. By integrating his family into the tradition of Roman 
ancestry he secured himself the symbolic pedestal of the quasi 
untouchable and thus justified his position at the helm of the empire.  
 
As far as explicit communication objectives are concerned there was 
among Augustus’ advisers - as indeed among the entire elite in Rome - 
an understanding that the republic needed to be restored in name at 
least and that the traditional values and old gods had to be revived to 
consolidate order and peace within. These were throughout his career 
the political objectives Augustus wanted his public persona to be 
identified with and his decision to restore the ancient temples was 
testimony to this goal. The strategy adopted was one of reciprocal 
negotiation and consent between Augustus and his key publics in an 
attempt to create the impression that the restoration of the republican 
order was a project the entire elite as well as the plebs would participate 
in under his guidance. The campaign to achieve this objective ran over a 
period of 20 years and incrementally led to a recognition among the elite 
that the political success of Augustus would benefit the state and was 
therefore worthy their support (Zanker, 1990; Eich, 2000). A collateral 
effect of his policies was a largely favourable coverage in the literature 
produced by his contemporaries. Augustus dominated prose and poetry 
by dominating public opinion, not by heavy handed interference (Weber 
et al, 2003). 
 
The scrutiny of evidence suggests that policy and communications 
management become instruments a leader resorts to in order to earn 
reputational credit which in turn serves as a strategic tool deployed to 
secure access to power and to justify their respective position at the 
apex of the political system. The strategy adopted by Augustus to 
generate his reputation can best be appreciated against the backdrop of 
the historical context, particularly Caesar’s murder by assassins who 
saw in him a threat to the republic. Whilst Caesar’s war report De Bello 
Gallico was a skilful tool to create images of him as a war leader, 
Augustus had to adopt a more sophisticated communication strategy 
that took into account popular sympathy for the republic and the elite’s 
wariness of monarchical rule. His approach hinged on relationship 
management and mutual communications that aimed at meeting the 
expectations of critical publics. In consequence, his position of power 
was not secured through the force of oppression, but buttressed by 
societal support and trust which is – as has been sketched out above – 
rooted in reputational judgements and serves as guidance for current 
behaviour. 
 
The features of political and communications management in the case of 
Augustus suggest that both messages and behaviour were guided by a 
necessity to preserve and create reputational credit. This conclusion 
may be indicative of the mind-set and approach taken by subsequent 
decision makers in politics. Arguably, this insight may provide a 
perspective that feeds into an interpretive framework which helps 
understand and make sense of political decisions and motivations for 
decisions taken not just by Augustus’ contemporaries but by leaders in a 
broader historical context.  
 
Claudius or how action shapes perception 
 
For long the debate about the motivation of Emperor Claudius’ decision 
for the Roman Empire to invade and occupy Britannia centred on natural 
resources, military strategy and a culturally innate drive to expand. By 
adopting reputation and reputation management as a concept and 
interpretive perspective the narrative is shifted and a plausible 
alternative account of causality presents itself: Claudius as a result of 
diverse ailments and physical shortcomings was by many seen as unfit 
to govern from the outset of his tenure. His reputation teetering on the 
brink of collapse was an open invitation for challenges to this authority. A 
decision to invade Britannia – a province not even conquered by the 
great Julius Caesar – would have strengthened Claudius’ relationship 
with critical stakeholders who may have taken this bold decision as a 
cue to allay fears the Emperor may not be up to the job. In other words, 
a thus strengthened reputation may be strategically the most desirable 
windfall from the campaign in Britannia.  
 
Politically speaking, Claudius was in a bind: His predecessor, the inept 
Caligula, had been removed and assassinated for blatant incompetence 
(Sueton, 2001). The stakeholders an Emperor needed support from – 
the army, the senatorial class and the people of Rome – expected a new 
leader’s military and political prowess to outshine Caligula’s. Otherwise 
the elite might have entertained thoughts of reverting to senatorial rule, 
doing away with imperial authority altogether.  
 
Initially, Claudius’ best claim to the throne were the backing of the 
praetorian guard, notorious for its fickle loyalty, and his Julio-Claudian 
imperial ancestry (Dio 1927; Josephus, 1983; Sueton, 2001). Neither 
was a strong enough pillar to maintain his reign in the long run if the 
army, the Senate and the Roman populace refused to be won over. In 
fact the political landscape abounded with serious opposition to the new 
Emperor: A general in Spain and the governor of Dalmatia were both 
ready to scramble for the imperial crown. Sulpicius Galba, commander 
of 25.00 men at the upper Rhine, also was thought to be scheming 
(Wiseman, 1982).1  
 
The populace in Rome expected to see someone at the helm who could 
credibly lead the empire politically, morally and militarily. For Spinrad 
                                                          
1 How real the threat by potential usurpers was at the time, become clear with hindsight, when the very Galba 
declared himself emperor following the death of Nero in 68 AD. 
(1991) a charismatic leadership figure was defined by these traits, none 
of which however one could associate with Claudius who was burdened 
by a charismatic deficit. Claudius knew he had to attain early on in his 
tenure a reputation for competence, likability, morality, potency and 
intimidation – five features Leary (1995) believes are essential for a 
leader’s efforts in garnering recognition and support among 
stakeholders. The new Emperor was a voracious reader and gifted 
historian and certainly aware of how the military reformer and general 
Marius – venerated, just as Scipio for this victories over Carthage - had 
built charismatic bonds with the legions and gained popular backing as a 
result of his military exploits. Julius Caesar, perhaps more than anyone 
else, had generated his charismatic public persona in the course of his 
triumphant campaign in Gaul (Livy, 1989; Froman, 1963).  
 
Bromley (1993) flags up the close relationship between charisma and 
reputation, with the latter hinging on the former. We are reminded of 
political public relations’ contribution to managing and safeguarding 
reputation - widely acknowledged by Strömbäck et al. (2011), Griffin 
(2008) and Cornelissen (2008) – by Claudius’ attempt to alter his public 
image through a rhetorical ploy. By referring to himself as Caesar he 
hoped to promote publicly his links with the reputable Julio-Claudian 
family line (Koster, 1994) and tap into his ancestors’ widely esteemed 
heritage as military leaders (Timpe, 1994). This need to establish 
personal political legitimacy – defined in this paper in the Lockean sense 
as originating from the consent of the governed (Ashcraft, 1991) - by 
drawing on the reputational mantle must have been seen by Claudius as 
the key to his survival at the apex of the political structure. Pandering to 
audiences and nurturing relationships with publics that appreciated 
strong military leadership and skills was in the view of Momigliano 
(1961) a means for the new Emperor to entrench his position.  
 
Against this backdrop Claudius’ decision to invade Britannia could be 
understood. The responses among the Roman elite and populace to his 
successful campaign would suggest that his reputation – his primary 
policy concern - had received a tangible and enduring boost. Dio (1927) 
reported how, upon Claudius’ return to Rome, the Senate proclaimed 
him triumphant. It announced annual games to commemorate his 
achievement and awarded him the honorary title Britannicus. The 
crowds flocked to the circus to see fights between wild animals from 
Africa, a spectacle staged in the name of Claudius who also had his 
victory re-enacted on the Field of Mars, the traditional assembly square 
(Sueton, 2001; Coleman, 1993). In honour of his military exploits in Via 
Flaminia an arch was erected to display the Emperor’s political and 
military record (Wallace-Hadrill, 1990). The invasion of Britannia 
remoulded Claudius’ public persona and suggested here was a man 
who did not hesitate to take courageous decisions, promote the empire’s 
expansion and ad to the glory of Rome. 
 
Veterans brimmed with pride for their share in the victories and were 
keen to display the honorary medals they had received at the hands of 
Claudius and his generals for their participation in the invasion (Kent, 
1966; Smallwood, 1984; Tacitus, 2008). The number of his political 
acolytes swelled and extended beyond the army as is evidenced by 
statues likening Claudius to Jupiter. These monumental busts and 
figures crept up all over Italy, commissioned by people who were willing 
to ignore the Emperor’s ungainly physique and contorted facial 
expression. Moreover local officials and dignitaries printed flattering 
images of the Emperor on coins (Erim, 1986; Kent, 1966; Smith, 1987). 
Thus, even the remote provinces accepted Claudius as a charismatic 
leader who deserved their support and adoration (Sueton, 2011).  
 
Evidence that the invasion of Britannia dramatically changed Claudius’ 
public persona and established his reputation as a competent 
administrator and courageous leader would assuage doubts about his 
skills and ability and provide him with the legitimacy required to 
command support from the Senate, the army and the populace. One 
may conclude, therefore, that the impact of military and political action 
on an individual’s reputation is significant. Leaders who are cognisant of 
this correlation and aware of a need to build up and protect their 
respective reputational credit may allow this rationale to guide their 
decision making processes. 
 
The end of Rome – when the reputation declined, the city fell 
 
The concept of reputation entails an inbuilt dichotomy as it serves to 
anticipate behaviour while it is also deployed as interpretative tool in an 
analysis of the past. In other words our understanding of reputation 
management’s function in guiding behaviour of protagonists and 
conditioning responses among stakeholders mirrors both its predictive 
as well as its interpretative dimension. Both the former and latter are of 
use not just in an executive context and invaluable for activities related 
to organisational auditing with a view to discern problems and best 
practice. Both dimensions assist historians in drilling to the core of what 
really happened by ascertaining causes, triggers and consequences. To 
this end the following paragraphs aim to discuss an alternative 
interpretive lens for the fall of the western Roman Empire, which ever 
since 476 has stirred intense and controversial debate among historians.  
 
It is being argued that one potential cause for the demise of Rome can 
be found by reviewing the developments in the 5th century which led to a 
transformation of the perception hostile tribes across the border had of 
the empire. As a result of negligent reputation management the images 
circulating among tribal leaders suggested Rome was - in contrast to 
previous centuries – neither willing nor capable of retaliating forcefully 
against threats to its authority and territorial integrity. This reticent use of 
force had both a strategic and symbolic effect which unleashed a vicious 
cycle by growing confidence among tribes that gradually coalesced until 
a critical mass emerged whose onslaught the Roman forces in the end 
found themselves overwhelmed by. It is suggested that during the 
heyday of the empire adept communications – through pageant and 
action – secured images of and a reputation for robust border defences, 
ruthless military policy and unheard of organisational skill which on 
aggregate did not go unnoticed beyond the border and in total 
substantially decreased the likelihood of actual physical attacks and 
raids that in turn allowed the Roman army to prevail over those limited 
numbers of raiders whose thirst for a confrontation could not be thwarted 
by displaying icons of power alone.  
 
Over centuries the belief among chieftains was such that a challenge to 
Rome would be costly and eventually futile. In the late 4th century this 
judgement was up for a comprehensive reconsideration as the 
Völkerwanderung (Barbarian invasion) loomed and manifested itself in 
unheard of convulsions throughout eastern and central Europe which 
unleashed migratory dynamics upon the populations to the west of the 
Dnipro River. The epochal confrontation had been kicked off by the 
onslaught of migrant horse people, referred to as the Huns, and their 
westward trajectory (Kulikowski, 2007; Halsall, 2008). As their 
advancement gained in thrust several tribes felt geographically and 
militarily sandwiched by their main adversaries - the Huns and the 
Romans. The subsequent moves engaged in by several chieftains were 
informed by reputational information and cognisant of an emerging 
strategic map that mirrored recent events such as the drubbing of the 
Romans in 378 AD during the battle of Adrianople at the hands of the 
Goths and Rome’s flawed attempts to push back the intruders. News of 
similar incursions the Romans failed to rebut and tales of raiders 
returning home with generous booty to the praise of their fellow 
tribesmen led to Rome’s incremental association with images of 
weakness and loss of military capacity which in turn informed the tribal 
decision-making process on who to turn against when the pressure from 
the Huns mounted (Geuenich, 2005; Schallmayer, 2011).  
 
Gradually, a new narrative was emerging that shaped predictions about 
the future behaviour of the empire in case of an attack. The 
consequences were staggering: Soon after the battle of Adrianople had 
crippled Rome’s reputation, the imperial army found itself engaged in 
various theatres of war to an extent that resources were stretched to 
breaking point (Goldsworthy, 2009). Suggestions that the ascendancy of 
Rome’s adversaries resulted from the numerical shrinking of the army 
have been confuted by Jones (1986), Elton (2006) and Duncan-Jones 
(1990) who agree that the numbers of soldiers enlisted in the late 
imperial period surpassed the army size earlier emperors had at their 
disposal by 30 to 100 per cent. 
 
In other words and in line with conventional definitions of the concept, 
reputation awarded the Romans for the better part of their history with 
what in management studies one may refer to as competitive advantage, 
which – as has been outlined above - over time was reversed as images 
emerged of ineptitude among Roman officials and military leaders. The 
decision of tribes which neighbour to turn against may have been led by 
reputational cues, based on past behaviour as a proxy for the kind of 
resistance they were likely to expect. 
 
Hence the argument could be advanced that a comparative reputational 
evaluation helped tribes resolve uncertainty and permitted them to take 
strategic decisions on who to align themselves with and who to raid for 
booty and territorial gain. By now images of Roman demise had become 
entrenched which informed strategic inferences arrived at by tribal 
chieftains and shaped collective action among tribes. While during 
Rome’s rise to an empire reputation served to keep external challenges 
at a minimum, the empire had now became associated with traits of 
incapacity which attracted a plethora of challengers and hostile forces it 
would not even in the heyday of its history have had the military and 




The cases presented in this paper expand on the concept of reputation, 
define the instrumental value of reputational information in explaining 
behaviour and decision making processes and proffer reputation as 
interpretive prism for historical analysis. In light of the cases discussed a 
number of inferences can be made in relation to approaches to historical 
analysis, practice of organisational management, societal implications, 
the significance of this study as well as the need for further research. 
 
The broader implication of the findings presented above may require 
historians to recast the net of analysis, integrate the concept of 
reputation into their existing range of analytical instruments and 
reconsider the premise, perspective, process and outcome of historical 
developments wherever the interpretive angle proposed by reputation 
management has so far not been given full consideration. Failure to 
recognise reputation as a significant concept in historical analysis does 
not only impair the fair and balanced reflection of personal and 
organisational stakeholder behaviour, but also thwarts a full appreciation 
of the motivation individual protagonists and institutional agents are 
driven by, whose decisions are central to historical processes and 
outcomes  
 
Historians’ quest to identify the motor of change will need to reflect the 
leverage exerted by concerns for personal and organisational reputation 
in moments of political precariousness that occur when solutions to 
conflictual processes are pending and dynamic environments or military 
conflicts cause scenarios of uncertainty. The concept advanced and 
explored in a range of four cases may be applicable more broadly and 
through further corroboration evolve into a ´model of comparative 
reputational evaluation` that lends itself as a tool to historical analysis. 
This model can be instrumental in casting light on causal action, 
decisions and outcomes in as far as it frames historical processes as a 
struggle for recognition and deference between competing holders of 
organisational and individual reputations. In other words, action and 
inaction are seen to illustrate in two distinct ways the competitive setting 
of reputational phenomena: They mirror efforts to build reputation and 
encapsulate stakeholders’ efforts to align themselves (as detected most 
vividly in the case study about Rome’s demise) with organisations and 
individuals whose reputational cues are most compelling, likely to bring 
about reward and tipped to prevail over adversaries – initially at a 
perceptual level which in consequence and accelerated by a gain or loss 
in reputational credit translates into a tangible reality of physical success 
and failure. 
 
For incumbents survival at the apex of an organisational structure 
appears to require ruthless and immediate action right at the outset of 
one’s tenure which in the case of Claudius seems to have been critical in 
securing his position. We may infer that the taxonomy of executive  
decision making will be almost exclusively oriented towards preservation 
of reputation, which in the four cases analysed appeared to be the 
primary predictor of outcomes and critical for a leader’s ability to perform 
and meet objectives. For this overarching emphasis to be attained other 
managerial considerations take second stage, whilst the recruitment and 
concentration of organisational resources intended to shore up and 
protect the leader’s reputational integrity takes centre stage 
 
What emerged, therefore, in all four case studies, is an understanding of 
´reputation bound immediacy` which suggests that right at the beginning 
of a leader’s tenure or at the outset of conflict the incentive to invest 
resources on reputation building and protection is at a premium. 
Considerations of policy that are not contributory to this objective are a 
perilous distraction from the agenda. The scenario surrounding 
Claudius’s unlikely rise to power and the overwhelming opposition 
waiting in the wings probably makes the strongest case for the 
managerial pertinence of ´reputation bound immediacy`, which blends 
reputation management with an insight into the most propitious timing. In 
the case of Hannibal’s campaign, too, the cues sent out to potential 
allies about the Carthaginians likely destiny and chances to carry victory 
would have had most impact in the early phase of the conflict, which is 
equivalent with the formative phase of Hannibal as a military leader and 
thus decisive for the growth of his reputation with stakeholders on the 
Italian peninsula. 
 
History’s role in explaining and accounting for reality past and present 
renders a historical analysis of the function ascribed to reputation in the 
moulding of political processes just as pertinent as an enquiry into the 
consequences of reputation with a view to understanding their societal 
fallout and impact on political discourse. Yet concern with images and 
public perception is not new to historical enquiry and known to affect 
personal lives and organisational management (Goffman, 1959). 
However, the cases studied here cast a light on how an anxiety to 
defend reputation has led to outcomes of epochal dimensions whose 
legacy makes itself felt over the course of centuries. Four hundred years 
of Roman rule in Britain has left its traces in the nation’s language and 
identity and the demise of the Roman Empire is a pivotal turning point in 
European history and the origin of a system of tribal kingdoms that 
paved the way for the subsequent emergence of nation states that 
shape the continent’s destiny to the present day. 
 
In another respect the findings in this paper are noteworthy in as far as 
they corroborate arguments in a more current debate: The idea of a 
promotional society (Davis, 2013) has elsewhere been comprehensively 
described as a paradigm for a contemporary discourse of Public 
Relation’s and impression management’s role in power distribution and 
political decision making. These phenomena may witness in the 
empirical data analysed in this paper their antecedents in as far as it has 
been suggested - in line with the emphasis placed on image 
management in the modern promotional society - that a robust 
reputation turns into a self-fulfilling prophecy of political success and 
organisational ascendancy. Reputation thus is at the core of a taxonomy 
of resources both democratic and authoritarian authority hinge on: Its 
making and breaking is contingent on reputation. This conclusion is an 
extension of an earlier debate about the balance of reality and image 
and their impact on the masses (Lippmann, 1922). Yet the argument 
advanced here transcends the traditional discourse in two ways: By 
highlighting both the role of reputational credit as a resource leaders and 
political entities accumulate and spend in pivotal moments of national 
and international history and by flagging up the large-scale 
consequences engineered by those who have superior access to this 
resource. 
 
The significance of this study particularly lies in its attempt to broaden 
the applicability of a concept that is widely used and comprehensively 
researched in a comparatively limited remit. Reputation – its 
antecedents, potential and consequences – is understood and 
discussed by authors in management and communication related 
disciplines, yet the focus of this discourse has traditionally been limited 
to cases of corporate impression management in the broadest sense. 
The pertinence of reputation and the weight of its impact has not been 
fully appreciated for lack of a wider perspective and limited interest 
among the community of management scholars in scenarios of national 
and international political consequence. By contrast, political scientists 
for years did draw on notions of impression, image and reputation, yet 
they fell short of engaging with the range of facets the concept had been 
ascribed to in management literature. 
 
The four cases drawn on above provide a more ample testing ground for 
the concept of reputation to demonstrate its versatility and level of 
impact. It becomes clear that reality we experience now and the 
narratives of past events are potentially much more the result of 
reputational considerations than might have been expected hitherto. In 
short, both a revised view of the concept in its own right as well as its 
highlighted role in determining societal outcomes and managerial 
constraints constitute ample evidence for the relevance of the findings 
presented in this study. 
 
In management literature reputation is conceptualised as a resource and 
the findings of this study suggests that political entities and leaders 
through action and communications appear to accumulate reputational 
credit which they subsequently spend with a view to attain objectives. 
This process raises questions for further research, foremost it should be 
asked how reputational credit is be put to use by leaders who intend to 
overcome opposition to necessary but unpopular reforms. In other 
words, can reputational credit be a tool that is drawn on by leaders to 
achieve beneficial policy objectives. This is a hypothesis raised by 
Schnee (2017) that could benefit from corroboration through historical 
case studies analysis. A related perspective for prospective research 
should be a concern with the antecedents and array of tools that allow 
for reputation to be built up and safeguarded. This question requires a 
closer look at a micro-organisational level that ascertains the mechanics 
of reputation building as well as the skills and knowledge political entities 
and leaders deploy in order to shore up and manage efficiently 
reputational credit.  
 
The set-up chosen for this paper casts a light on the critical role of 
reputational credit in highly conflictual situations. If we were to adjust the 
analytical zoom once more to the macro level it is to be seen if a 
different selection of cases were to confirm the findings presented here 
which originate exclusively from scenarios that witness highest stakes 
such as war and imperial power. The question is warranted as to 
whether the emphasis on reputation as a pivotal resource capable of 
preserving or tipping a fragile power structure is replicated once the 
protagonists were placed in a less conflictual environment and the sakes 
minimised. It would, therefore, be valuable to ascertain in a future study 
if under altered circumstances systematic reputation management were 
still the overriding strategic option and causal in organisational 
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